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The idiomatic expression ‘new frontiers’ leaves me fairly in trouble.
Should the term ‘new frontiers’ imply the idea that previous limits have been 
over-reached and that new spaces have been conquered or discovered? Or should 
‘new frontiers’ be understood to be like new borders imposed upon previously 
vacant spaces? 
It might be said that the theme of the ‘new frontiers of comparative law’ 
intersects new   elds and methodological approaches of the comparison of law by 
way of a more meditated and cutting-edge rethinking of the already-tracked paths 
of research.
In this latter sense, my modest purpose here is to meditate on the increasing 
consensus of the scienti  c community about the category of the ‘mixed 
jurisdictions’ as a sort of ‘tertium genus’ in the classi  catory efforts that 
traditionally engage comparative lawyers by grouping worldwide legal systems 
into ‘families’ that share common and lingering features.
In particular, I wonder what are – if there are any – epistemological conditions 
regarding the justi  cation, usefulness and fruitfulness of the family that we have 
named as the family of ‘mixed jurisdictions’.
PREMISES
Some premises are necessary for clarifying the coordinates of sense that de  ne 
my reasoning.
The Didactic Purpose of Any Classificatory Efforts 
Each legal classi  cation has represented, and still represents, a pale, generalised 
attempt to manage the complexity of the reality: ‘families’ such as common law, 
civil law, Muslim law and so forth, tell us nothing more than what is often too 
generic, falsi  able and oversimpli  ed information about the macro features of 
legal systems.1
1 See A. Harding, (2002) ‘Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East 
Asia’, (51) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 36; E. Örücü, What is 
a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?, Vol. 12.1 Electronic Journal Of 
Comparative Law (May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-15.pdf; E. Cashin 
Ritaine, S.P. Donland, M. Sychold, Comparative law and hybrid legal traditions, 
56
New Frontiers of Comparative Law
All classi  catory efforts are a result of the natural human response and 
inclination to compress the diversity of legal world and to make it understandable 
and transmissible: it is an attempt to get the point of the main differences and 
similarities between different cultures, contexts and historical experiences.
Having said that, in my opinion, didactic and explanatory purposes return the 
sole reasonable dimension of all legal classi  catory attempts, that is, somehow 
providing the basis for a relatively uniform and international nomenclature.2
The Extreme Relativity of Outcomes of Any Classifications 
Each legal classi  cation is extremely fragile and deeply conditioned by external 
and internal elements. It should be noted that not only does the explanatory 
validity of a classi  cation depend on a certain historical period in which a certain 
legal system is considered3, but it also largely depends on the point of view of the 
observer.4
Lausanne 10–11September 2009, Schulthess, Zurich, 2010; F. Fiorentini, Terium 
datur, le giurisdizioni ‘miste’ tra common law e civil law, Riv. Crit. Dir. Priv., 2002, 
fasc. 3, pp. 449–459; V.V. Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011; I. Castellucci, How Mixed Must a Mixed System Be?, vol. 
12.1 Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law (May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/
art121-4.pdf, p. 17: ‘The world’s legal reality is very complex and we should not 
try and oversimplify it; when classifying it, what we   nd is that making recourse 
to the few simple categories of the past is not enough anymore. New classi  catory 
labels will necessarily require more speci  c words than classic comparative law 
classi  cations, as the legal world is more complex than it used to be – or as so we 
now perceive it to be’.
2 R. David, Major legal systems in the world today, Stevens, 1988, p. 21 (translation 
of the original French version Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains, Paris, 
1964).
3 Just thirty years ago, Prof. Victor Li of Stanford University, entitled his book 
about Chinese law as ‘Law without lawyers’, in which he states that ‘not having a 
substantial legacy of law and lawyers, contemporary Chinese society has assigned 
many functions which are handled by law in the United States to non legal organs’. 
Today the ‘Nutshell’ pocket book on the Chinese legal system states that ‘although a 
western concept of the rule of law failed to take root in China, China’s rulers did use 
law as an instrument of social control’, and that ‘China has made important progress 
in establishing rights of the individual as protection against the type of mindless 
persecution of innocent victims (...) China has also made particularly signi  cant 
strides in enacting new laws in the area of commercial and business law, intellectual 
property, administrative litigation and reform of the judiciary’(see D.C.K. Chow, 
The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China, Nutshell, 2009, pp. 64–65).
4 See K. Zweigert, H. Kõtz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford, 1998, pp. 
68: ‘the following factors seem to us to be those which are crucial for the style of 
a legal system or legal family: (1) its historical background and development, (2) 
its predominant and characteristic mode of thought in legal matters, (3) especially 
distinctive institutions, (4) the kind of legal sources it acknowledges and the way it 
handles them, and (5) its ideology’; see also R. David, Major legal systems in the 
world today, (ibid), which uses the following as elements for setting up groups in 
distinguished legal families: the historical formation of the system; the structure of 
the law (divisions and concepts and concepts of the legal rule); the sources of law; 
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In his classi  catory efforts, the observer may consider only the formal and 
express law, or he may also include informal, hidden and customary law; he could 
pay attention only to a general branch of law (private law or public law), or he 
could go deeply into detail with a speci  c   eld of law (family law or commercial 
law for example); he could deal with the classi  catory matter using juristic 
methodology or address them using a sociological and anthropological approach.
Any decision of the observer, and to an extent, maybe even his mood or 
political inclination, remarkably in  uences the outcome of his work.
The ‘Geopolitical’ Intent of Classifications 
Generally speaking, any legal classi  cation has to be considered as an expression 
of a certain ‘political’ (in a broader sense) and cultural idea as it pursues a 
hegemonic strategy, proposes a particular model as the ‘best’ and more ef  cient 
and prestigious than the others.
The intent of scholars was, and maybe still is, to make their own legal system 
attractive in the global market of legal borrowings, imitations and transplants.
A recent work edited by John W. Head examined the civil law, the common 
law and the Chinese law legal systems and is eloquently entitled ‘Great Legal 
Traditions’.5 Not only does the title reveal a certain shift towards a judgment 
of value about the ‘greatness’ of some legal traditions and not of others, but the 
Chinese legal system has also appeared to be among the ‘greatest’. This is the 
same Chinese law that, just few years ago, was relegated in the more generic 
family of the ‘law of the far east’.6
This, it seems to me, is the litmus test – if needed – of how legal classi  cations 
mostly follow the geopolitical and economical changes in a certain historical 
moment.
The (De)Construction of the Concept of ‘Mixing’
I do not want to plunge into details of different theories7 that try to ‘isolate’ the 
family of ‘mixed’, ‘composed’, ‘hybrid’ legal systems from the rest of the legal 
U. Mattei, (1997), ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World 
Legal Systems’, 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 5, which classi  es legal 
systems according to the relative importance of the co-existing three fundamental 
types of social regulators: tradition, politics, and the law.
5 J.W. Head, Great legal traditions, Carolina Academic Press, 2011.
6 R. David, Major legal systems in the world today, Stevens, 1988, pp. 516 ss.; K. 
Zweigert, H. Kõtz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford, 1998, pp. 286 ss.
7 For the ‘classical theory’ of mixed jurisdictions see V.V. Palmer, Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide: the third legal family, Edinburgh, 2001, in which the author outlines 
three abstract characteristics that would distinguish mixed jurisdictions from others, 
p. 7: ‘these systems are built upon dual foundations of common law and civil law 
materials (…) common law and civil law constitute the basic building blocks of 
the legal edi  ce. (…) Psychologically speaking, actors and observers within such 
a system will be cognizant of and will acknowledge the dual character of the law. 
(…) in every case the civil law will be cordoned off within the   eld of private law, 
thus creating the distinction between private continental law and public Anglo-
American law. This structural allocation of content is invariable in the family’; V.V. 
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world; it is simply enough to verify that this ‘new category’ also appears as 
problematic and as largely dispute as the numerous classi  catory efforts regarding 
‘pure’ legal systems.
It is enough to observe that, similar to the traditional classi  cations, the ‘new’ 
category of ‘mixed jurisdictions’ also does miss out on a common and undisputed 
theory and de  nition.
Palmer, Mixed jurisdictions compared – Private law in Louisiana and Scotland, 
Edinburgh, 2009; K. Reid, The idea of mixed legal systems, (2003) 78 Tulane LR 
5. See also Colin B. Picker, Beyond the Usual Suspects: Application of the Mixed 
Jurisdiction Jurisprudence To International Law and Beyond, vol. 12.1 Electronic 
Journal Of Comparative Law (May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-18.pdf; 
W. Tetley, ‘Mixed jurisdictions : common law vs civil law (codi  ed and uncodi  ed)’, 
in http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tetley.html. For an economic analysis 
perspective of the matter of legal classi  cations, see A Ogus, The contribution of 
economic analysis of law to legal transplants, in J.M. Smits (ed.), The contribution 
of mixed systems to European private law, Intersentia, 2001.  
  For a different point of view, see E. Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: 
Exclusion or Expansion?, vol. 12.1 Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law 
(May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-15.pdf, p. 6: ‘When legal systems 
are considered as overlaps, combinations, marriages and off-spring, terminology 
such as fertilisation, pollination, grafting, intertwining, osmosis and pruning can 
illuminate the processes of the birth of mixed systems’, and p. 13: ‘When looked 
through the lens of history, we see that many of the mixes of the past were formed 
by strong movements of transmigration of legal institutions and ideas, mostly in the 
form of impositions, and of divergent linguistic, communal or religious traditions. 
Legal systems, like cake mixes, are constantly mixing, blending, melting, and then 
solidifying into new shapes as they cool down, while transposition and tuning take 
their effect. Special attention must be paid to legalcultural convergence and non-
convergence that may come about as a result of legal import, and to any ensuing 
sociocultural non-convergence. In this context, cultural pluralism, clash of diverse 
cultures, and the consequences for the importing legal system are of particular 
contemporary interest and legal pluralism is another signi  cant concern. All can 
be examined within the context of “mixed systems”.’ See also E. Örücü, (2004) 
Enigma of Comparative Law – Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-First Century 
(Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff), Chapter 10:3; E. Örücü, A General View of Legal 
Families and of Mixing Systems, in E Örücü, D. Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A 
Handbook (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) Chapter 8, pp. 169 ss.; M.van Hoecke, 
M. Warrington, (1998) ‘Legal Cultures and Legal Paradigms: Towards a New Model 
for Comparative Law’, (47) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 495.
  A geo-legal perspective is outlined by I. Castellucci, How Mixed Must a Mixed 
System Be?, vol. 12.1 Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law (May 2008), http://
www.ejcl.org/121/art121-4.pdf, p. 15: ‘Other current classi  cations could also be 
devisable based on the belonging of the classi  able jurisdictions to geo-political 
blocks, as far as this belonging affects their legal systems; a geo-legal approach, if 
we like’.
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Different approaches to the matter necessitate a confrontation over the types 
of mixture8 and also the degree of mixture that should be considered.9 
From what has been exposed so far about the general conceptual uncertainty 
of classi  cation in legal families, the reading of the important scienti  c efforts to 
cope with this constellation of the mixed, remixed, hybrid legal systems indicates 
that there is much more to be done to give shape to these new developments.
Good Questions for a Better Understanding 
In my opinion, two questions deserve a clear answer: (1) whether comparative 
lawyers need to study those jurisdictions that present remarkable elements of 
cross-fertilisation and ‘mixedness’ and; (2) whether comparative lawyers really 
need a speci  c category called ‘mixed jurisdictions’.
Comparative analysis would bene  t very much from the study of those 
jurisdictions which, for example, have already experienced the accommodation 
of civil law and common law a single legal system.10 It might be fruitful in the 
8 E. Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?, vol. 12.1 
Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law (May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art 
121-15.pdf, p. 16: ‘It is dif  cult to determine the exact level of hybridity in each 
legal system. However, what is clear is that combinations of disparate legal and 
social cultures do give birth to mixed systems. Overlap, cross-fertilisation, reciprocal 
in  uence, horizontal transfer, fusion, infusion, grafting and the like all contribute to 
the coming into being of mixed and mixing systems. All are forever in   ux, as are 
all legal systems. The various degrees of hybridity arise from various degrees, levels 
and layers of encounters, crossing and intertwining’.
9 E. Örücü, A General View of Legal Families and of Mixing Systems, in E Örücü, 
D. Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 
Chapter 8, p. 177: ‘When talking of – mixed legal systems – the importance of – 
ongoing mixing – of legal systems must also be considered. In ongoing states of – 
mix –, a wide knowledge is required to fully analyse this phenomenon, since many 
systems are shifting and in transition, and new types of mixes are constantly coming 
into being’. 
10 R. McGonigle, The Role of Precedents in Mixed Jurisdictions: A Comparative Analysis 
of Louisiana and the Philippines, vol 6.2 Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law, 
(July 2002), http://www.ejcl.org/62/art62-1.html, p. 22: ‘The experience of these 
mixed jurisdictions is immeasurable because of their innate ability to circumvent the 
weaknesses inherent in, and enhance the strengths of, both traditions. For proponents 
of the common law, mixed jurisdictions such as Louisiana and the Philippines, can 
serve as a guide to point out stumbling blocks in administering a system of codi  ed 
law. For civilians, mixed jurisdictions can show the advantages of having a powerful 
judiciary and molding the civil law to   t the requirements of an ever-changing 
world. For both traditions, mixed jurisdictions offer a unique opportunity for closer 
contact – vrai rapprochement – because of their ability to walk through both systems 
with ease. It has been said, however, that the apparent is often elusive to perceive, 
and this might be the case with our two sample mixed jurisdictions’. See also A. 
Cooray, Oriental and Occidental Laws in Harmonious Co-existence: The Case of 
Trusts in Sri Lanka, vol. 12.1 Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law (May 2008), 
http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-5.pdf; M. Herbst, W. du Plessis, Customary Law v 
Common Law Marriages: A Hybrid Approach in South Africa, vol. 12.1 Electronic 
Journal Of Comparative Law (May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-28.pdf.
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perspective of a new European ius commune11 or of a more uniformed international 
private law12 or a more harmonised international law13.
Furthermore, the study of legal systems where lawyers have had to deal 
with very diverse legal traditions (for example, Hinduism, Confucian, Islamic 
traditions, indigenous customs and praxis14 that have overlapped and mixed with 
western legal traditions15), might represent not only fruitful knowledge for a better 
understanding of our multicultural societies, but also a bundle of legal instruments 
and ideas with which to address multicultural matters.
The same might not be said for the second question.
In a diachronic perspective, the art of classifying legal systems stemmed from 
a world where clear boundaries and fences existed to separate one nation from 
another. The identity of these nations has been traditionally built in a chauvinist and 
mythological way, for example, the centrality of the Civil Code, the insuperability 
of ‘Our Lady the Common Law’, the indispensability of the Written Constitution 
11 J. Smith, The contribution of mixed legal systems to European private law, Intersentia, 
2001; see also J. Smits, ‘A European Private Law as a Mixed Legal System’, 5 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, (1998),  328; Jan M. Smits, 
Scotland as a Mixed Jurisdiction and the Development of European Private Law: Is 
There Something to Learn from Evolutionary Theory?, vol. 7.5 Electronic Journal 
Of Comparative Law, (December 2003); Jan M. Smits, Mixed Jurisdictions: Lessons 
for European Harmonisation?, vol. 12.1 Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law 
(May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-23.pdf. 
12 A. Fiorini, The Codi  cation of Private International Law in Europe: Could the 
Community Learn from the Experience of Mixed Jurisdictions?, vol. 12.1 Electronic 
Journal Of Comparative Law (May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-7.pdf, 
p. 13: ‘It must be stressed that it is not impossible to organise or establish a system of 
private international law that successfully mixes common law and civil law features. 
The very experience of mixed legal systems con  rms this view. Presenting the new 
Louisiana private international law codi  cation, Symeonides concluded that this 
code did not aspire to resolve the perennial tension between the common law and 
civil law in  uences but could reconcile the two traditions and provide for them a 
framework for an interactive and hopefully productive coexistence’.
13 C.B. Picker, Beyond the Usual Suspects: Application of the Mixed Jurisdiction 
Jurisprudence to International Law and Beyond, vol. 12.1 Electronic Journal Of 
Comparative Law (May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-18.pdf. 
14 Fairly different from the opinion of V.V. Palmer, Mixed jurisdictions worldwide: the 
third legal family, Edinburgh, 2001, p. 4: ‘(…) indigenous law and custom may be 
simultaneously operating outside of the western European system and may be, by 
any real measure, a far more important source of legal control for the majority of the 
population. Yet as I see matters, despite these different external factors, the mixed 
legal systems (…) have profound generalizable resemblances (…)’. 
15 See E.A. Black, G.F. Bell (ed), Law and legal institutions of Asia, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011; Poh-Ling Tan, Asian legal systems, Butterworths, 1997; 
M.B. Hooker, Law and Chinese in Southeast Asia, Singapore, 2002, p. 3: ‘Not only 
they (European powers) supreme in politics, economics, and militarily but also 
intellectually, and this is particularly clear in law.  European laws were imposed 
directly (as in imperial possessions) or indirectly (as in demands made through 
treaties of extra-territoriality). The result was more or less the same in both cases; it 
was the subjection of the Asian law to the European selection, validation, and indeed 
a new de  nition of law’.
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as the fundamental statute of the Nation, the extraordinary   exibility of the ‘stare 
decisis’ principle (binding precedent), and so forth.16
If we examine the history of the comparison of law in parallel, we could 
easily observe (I refer, for example, to the work of Gino Gorla in Italy17), that 
the efforts of the comparatists, on the one hand, were concentrated in   nding 
differences rather than similarities amongst legal systems; and that on the other 
hand, comparative legal studies and legal classi  cation were conditioned (often in 
a hidden and non-verbalised way) from the idea that only one kind of law exists, 
for example. law is only con  ned to the statutes, judicial decisions, de  nitions of 
legal doctrines given by scholars, and so on.
The combination of a legal political perspective that concentrates on the idea 
of the uniqueness and ‘special identity’ of the nation and a comparison of law 
that purports to   nd differences (by marking legal territories, families and legal 
system with inelastic classi  catory terms) has imposed, for example, the terms 
‘dichotomy’ and not that of ‘dialogue’ in describing the idea of a relationship 
between common law and civil law.
Factors such as ostracism, ghettoisation, physical and ‘intellectual’ isolation 
of mixed jurisdictions18 that are complained about by some scholars (Jaques du 
Plessis speaks of a ‘classi  catory limbo’ and Professor Reid terms it ‘the product 
of a failure of classi  cation’), may provide an explanation to this rhetorical and 
euro-centric approach to the law and to the legal cultures.19
However, I observe that the present world has changed signi  cantly and 
is more complicated and blurred in comparison with the world that produced 
those classi  catory efforts. Modern elements to be considered include the crisis 
of the traditional division between public and private law, the disaggregation 
and reconstruction of the municipal scheme of the sources of law, a globalised 
economy and multicultural society; all of which put the traditional categories of 
law and deeply-rooted beliefs under stress. 
Modern and extraordinarily powerful and re  ned concealed forces push in 
the direction of hybridity, cross-fertilisation and reciprocal in  uences in all legal 
systems.20 The processes of global or macro-regional uniformation, uni  cation 
and harmonisation (for example, European Union, WTO, OHADA, and so forth) 
16 P. Grossi, Mitologie giuridiche della modernità, Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 2005.
17 G. Gorla, Diritto comparato e diritto comune europeo, Milano, Giuffrè, 1981.
18 V.V. Palmer, ‘Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems’, vol. 12.1 Electronic 
Journal Of Comparative Law (May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-16.pdf, 
p. 2.
19 See V.V. Palmer, Mixed jurisdictions worldwide: the third legal family, Edinburgh, 
2001, p. 13–14: ‘(…) the mixed jurisdictions became intellectual battlegrounds 
where passions, prejudices and considerable learning occasionally took to the 
barricades. Here, the uninitiated visitor is liable to hear of exotic   gures called 
purists, pragmatists and pollutionists and may have the occasion to read a sometimes 
emotionally charged, self-regarding literature that has no exact parallel in other 
systems’.
20 See for a new approach to classi  catory effort of legal families U. Mattei, (1997), 
‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World Legal Systems’, 45 
American Journal of Comparative Law 5; M. Lupoi, Sistemi giuridici comparati, 
Napoli, 2001.
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represent massive and impressive movements that not only push towards our 
territorial frontiers, but also, once established in a country and formed within a 
well-integrated community, also push towards our legal frontiers, thus reclaiming 
a legal recognition of collective identity speci  cities and peculiarities (droit a la 
difference!).21; and   nally, the growing process of a law without a State: law that 
is elaborated upon in big international law   rms (outside the democratic law-
making process), and spread and imposed upon in each legal system through 
multinational enterprise mechanisms.22
If we are seriously interested in exploring diacronical and sincronical 
phenomenon of hybridity, only the biunivocal perspective and lingering tension 
between global and local appears inevitable and fruitful. 
CONCLUSION
In drawing conclusion from what has emerged so far, I confess my dif  culty in 
understanding the necessity of a category of ‘mixed jurisdictions’, considering 
that every classi  ed ‘legal family’ is the outcome of an assessment of the 
‘predominance’ of one feature over the others.
It is a fact that no ‘pure legal system’ has existed or is in existence: the 
uniqueness and absolute originality of each legal system is more of a rhetoric 
assertion than a scienti  c consideration. So the legal world should be seen as a 
world of ‘contaminations’ rather than a world split up into different families.
Rather than celebrating the birth of a new family, diversity and hybridity 
should simply be recognised as a paramount feature of each legal system.
I argue that, far from enhancing our understanding of complexity of legal 
system, the so called ‘mixed legal system’ category threatens to undermine, if not 
replace, the analytical function and epistemological standards of the research on 
the legal systems. Even if it is only to be understood in a historical perspective 
and only for didactic purposes to outline the main and general features of different 
legal traditions and cultures, it does not help. Quite to the contrary, addressing 
the historical   ux of the countless variations of these main general features by 
using the category of mixed family not only could generate or strengthen (as has 
already happened) the wrong idea of a contraposition between pure and mixed 
jurisdictions, but it also runs the risk of hiding, simplifying and trivialising the 
complexity and ontological hybridity of the present legal reality. 
21 See E. Jayme, Identité culturelle et intégration: Le droit international privé 
postmoderne, RCADI, 251(1996).
22 See Y. Dezalay, Merchands de droit. Le restructuration de l’ordre juridique 
international par les multinationals du droit, Paris, Fayard, 1992.
